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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Juan L. Juarez appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction for
felony DUI.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 18,2011, Juarez drove with a suspended license and a B.A.C. of
.315. (PSI, pp.2; Tr., p.33, L.12 - p.34, L.21, p.177, L.16 - p.178, L.3.) The
state charged him with felony DUI.
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(R., ppA5-48, 51-54.) Before trial, the state

filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling on whether Juarez's prior DUI convictions
out of Nevada and California qualified as "substantially conforming foreign
criminal violations" under I.C. § 18-8005(10), such that they could be relied on by
the state as the basis for the enhancement of Juarez's DUI to a felony.

(R.,

pp.59-60.) While the motion was pending, Juarez pled guilty to DUI, as alleged
in Count One, Part One of the Amended Information, but he requested a trial on
the felony enhancement.

(Tr., p.16, L.20 - p.17, LA, p.27, L.10 - p.35, L.5.)

Juarez effectively conceded that his California DUI conviction could be used for
purposes of enhancement (see Tr., p.38, Ls.15-17), but argued his Nevada DUI
conviction could not because, he contended, the Nevada DUI statute does not
substantially conform to Idaho's DUI statute (R., pp.70-77; Tr., p.58, L.7 - p.62,
L.5, p.78, 17 - p.81, L.13, p.92, L.18 - p.93, L.13). The district court disagreed,

1 The state also charged Juarez with misdemeanor DWP and possessing an
open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle (R., ppA5-48, 51-54), but those
charges were subsequently dismissed pursuant to the state's motions (R., pp.6669, 132-35).
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ruling "the statutes are substantially conforming," and it permitted the state to use
Juarez's Nevada DUI conviction for enhancement purposes. (Tr., p.94, L.21 p.100, L. 7, p.104, L.25 - p.1 05, L.3.)
Following a court trial, the district court found Juarez guilty of the felony
enhancement. (Tr., p.105, L.16 - p.157, L.5.) It thereafter entered a judgment
of conviction and order of probation, from which Juarez timely appealed. (R.,
pp.116-21, 136-39.)
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ISSUE
Juarez states the issue on appeal as:
Is Nevada's DUI statute a substantially conforming foreign criminal
violation under Idaho Code § 18-8005(10)?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Did the district court correctly rule that Juarez's Nevada DUI conviction
qualifies as a "substantially conforming foreign criminal felony violation" for
purposes of enhancement pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-8005(6) and (10)?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Determined That Juarez's Nevada DUI Conviction
Qualifies As A "Substantially Conforming Foreign Criminal Felony Violation" For
Purposes Of Enhancement Pursuant To I.C. §§ 18-8005(6) And (10)
A.

Introduction
The district court ruled that Juarez's Nevada DUI conviction qualified as a

"substantially conforming foreign criminal felony violation" for purposes of
enhancing his DUI charge to a felony pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-8005(6) and (10).
Juarez challenges the district court's ruling, essentially arguing, as he did below,
that Nevada's DUI statute prohibits conduct that is not prohibited by Idaho's DUI
statute and, as such, the statutes are not "substantially conforming." (Appellant's
brief, pp.9-11.)

Juarez's argument fails.

Application of the correct legal

standard, which requires comparison of the elements of Nevada's DUI statute
with those of I.C. § 18-8004, supports the district court's determination that the
statutes are "substantially conforming."

B.

Standard Of Review
"The determination of whether a foreign criminal violation is substantially

conforming is a question of law to be determined by the court."

I.C. § 18-

8005(10). The construction and application of a statute also presents a question
of law, over which the appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Moore, 148
Idaho 887,897,231 P.3d 532, 542 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho
800, 803, 172 P.3d 555,558 (Ct. App. 2007).
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C.

Comparison Of Nevada's DUI Statute With Idaho's DUI Statute Shows
The Two Statutes Are "Substantially Conforming"
It is a well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that the clearly

expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect, thus leaving no occasion
for construction where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous.
State v. Scott, 135 Idaho 457, 458-59, 19 P.3d 771, 772-73 (Ct. App. 2001).
The state charged Juarez pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-8004, which defines the
elements of DUI, and 18-8005(6), which provides that a DUI is a felony if the
defendant has "two (2) or more violations of the provisions of section 188004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, or any substantially conforming foreign
criminal violation, or any combination thereof, within ten (10) years" ,," (See R,
pp.51-52.)

Idaho Code § 18-8005(10) specifically defines "a substantially

conforming foreign criminal violation" for the purpose of I.C. § 18-8005(6) as
follows:
For the purpose of subsections (4), (6) and (9) of [section
18-8005] and the provisions of section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, a
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation exists when a
person has pled guilty to or has been found guilty of a violation of
any federal law or law of another state, or any valid county, city, or
town ordinance of another state substantially conforming to the
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code. The determination of
whether a foreign criminal violation is substantially conforming is a
question of law to be determined by the court.
I.C. § 18-8005(10) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a court determining whether
a foreign DUI conviction qualifies as "a substantially conforming foreign criminal
violation" must compare the provisions of the foreign law to which the defendant
pled guilty or was found guilty of violating with the provisions of I.C. § 18-8004,
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which set forth the elements of DUI in Idaho.

See also State v. Moore, 148

Idaho 887,898,231 P.3d 532, 543 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho
800, 803, 172 P.3d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 2007). If the provisions of the foreign law
"substantially conform" to the provisions of I.C. § 18-8004 (i.e., the elements of
DUI in the foreign state substantially conform to the elements of DUI in Idaho),
the foreign conviction is a "substantially conforming foreign criminal violation" as
a matter of law.
Review shows the provisions of the Nevada DUI statute under which
Juarez was convicted "substantially conform" to the elements of I.C. § 18-8004.
The Nevada DUI statute in effect at the time of Juarez's Nevada DUI conviction
provided, in relevant part:
1. It is unlawful for any person who:
(a) Is under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
(b) Has a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in his blood or
breath; or
(c) Is found by measurement within 2 hours after driving or being in
actual physical control of a vehicle to have a concentration of
alcohol of 0.08 or more in his blood or breath,
to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or
on premises to which the public has access.

4. If consumption is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it
is an affirmative defense under paragraph (c) of subsection 1 that
the defendant consumed a sufficient quantity of alcohol after
driving or being in actual physical control of the vehicle, and before
his blood or breath was tested, to cause him to have a
concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in his blood or breath. A
defendant who intends to offer this defense at a trial or preliminary
hearing must, not less than 14 days before the trial or hearing or at
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such other time as the court may direct, file and serve on the
prosecuting attorney a written notice of that intent.
(State's Exhibit 3 (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.379).)

In comparison, the relevant

provision of I.C. § 18-8004, under which Juarez was charged in this case, states:
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of
alcohol ... or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined
in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of
his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street
or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public.
I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a).
The elements of DUI, as defined in the Nevada and Idaho statutes, are
virtually indistinguishable.

See Schmoll, 144 Idaho at 803, 172 P.3d at 558

("The legislature expressly provided that the focus of the comparison should be
on the elements of the statutes, and not the specific conduct giving rise to the
prior violation.") Both statutes require as elements that the person be "under the
influence" of alcohol or intoxicating liquor or, alternatively, that the person have
an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more in his system; that the person "drive or
be in actual physical control" of a vehicle; and that the vehicle be on public
property or private property open to the public. Although the statutes are not
worded identically, both frame their prohibitions using very similar language and,
ultimately, both "prohibit the same essential conduct - driving while under the
influence of alcohol." Schmoll, 144 Idaho at 804, 172 P.3d at 559, quoted in
Moore, 148 Idaho at 898, 231 P.3d at 543. Because the statutes proscribe the
same or very similar conduct, the I.C. §§ 18-8005(6) and (10) analysis of
whether Juarez was determined to be guilty under the "law of another state ...
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substantially conforming to the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code," leads
to the inescapable conclusion that Juarez is guilty of a felony. See Schmoll, 144
Idaho at 804, 172 P.3d at 559, quoted in Moore, 148 Idaho at 898, 231 P.3d at
543, ("These two statutes frame their prohibitions using the same language,
requiring substantially conforming elements to be met to sustain a violation.").
In an attempt to demonstrate they are not "substantially conforming,"
Juarez points to what he characterizes as "two glaring difference [sic] in the
elements between the Idaho and Nevada DUI statutes." (Appellant's brief, p.9.)
According to Juarez, the first difference is that, in addition to criminalizing the act
of driving while under the influence of alcohol or with a blood alcohol
concentration of 0.08 - which Juarez contends is the sole conduct proscribed by
Idaho's DUI statute - the Nevada statute also makes it "unlawful to have a blood
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater within two hours of driving, regardless of
whether the person's blood alcohol concentration was below 0.08 at the time of
driving." (Id. (emphasis original).) Thus, he contends, "[t]he plain language of
the Nevada statute prohibits different conduct than Idaho's statute, namely
Nevada's statute also criminalizes driving followed by a blood alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or greater within two hours of driving."

(ld. (emphasis

original).) Juarez's reliance on this "difference" between the Nevada DUI statute
and I.C. § 18-8004 to demonstrate the statutes are not "substantially conforming"
fails for at least three reasons.
First, although Nevada's DUI statute plainly criminalizes the act of driving
or being in actual physical control of a vehicle followed, within two hours, by a
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test for alcohol concentration showing a B.A.C. of 0.08 or more, see Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 484.379(1)(c), there is no substantive difference between the elements of
DUI under the Nevada statute and those under I.C. § 18-8004.

Contrary to

Juarez's assertions, the act criminalized by I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) is not driving or
being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more; it is driving or being in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle with "an alcohol concentration of 0.08 '" or more, as shown by
analysis of his blood, urine, or breath." I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) (emphasis added).

Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, it is a person's alcohol
concentration at the time of the test, not at the time he or she was driving, that
determines whether the person is guilty of DUI.

Likewise, under subsection

(1)(c) of the Nevada statute, it is the person's alcohol concentration at the time of
the test (following the act of driving or being in actual physical control of a
vehicle) that controls whether the person is guilty of DUI. The elements of the
two statutes are thus essentially identical, compelling the conclusion that the
statutes are "substantially conforming." 2
Second, even assuming, as Juarez contends, that "the Nevada statute
prohibits different conduct than Idaho's statute" (Appellant's brief, p.9), such

That the Nevada statute caps the window for testing at two hours after the
person has driven or been in actual physical control of a vehicle does not change
this analysis. To the contrary, the requirement in Nevada that the state show as
an element of the crime that a test for alcohol concentration was conducted
within two hours after the person drove or was in actual physical control of a
vehicle actually imposes a higher burden on the state than that imposed by I.C. §
18-8004, which requires no showing that the test for alcohol concentration was
conducted within any particular timeframe.
2
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does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the statutes are not "substantially
conforming." In fact, the Idaho Court of Appeals has already explicitly rejected
the proposition that "to be 'substantially conforming, another state's DUI statute
may never encompass conduct that would not be illegal in Idaho." Moore, 148
Idaho at 898, 231 P.3d at 543. In so doing, the Court reasoned that such an
interpretation would not only "deviate from the general thrust of Schmoll [144
Idaho 800, 172 P.3d 555] and I.C. § 18-8005(8),,,3 both of which require
comparison of the plain language of the two statutes, it would also "run counter
to the legislature's clear intent evidenced by using the term 'substantially
conforming,' as opposed to a dictate that the statutes be exactly the same."
Moore, 148 Idaho at 898, 231 P.3d at 543. See also Schmoll, 144 Idaho at 804,
172 P.3d at 559 ("Substantial conformity does not require exact correspondence
between the two statutes."). Because, as explained above, the plain language of
the Nevada and Idaho DUI statutes prohibits the same or very similar conduct,
the statutes are, at a minimum, "substantially conforming."
The third and final reason Juarez's reliance on the "within 2 hours after
driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle" language of Nevada's DUI
statute to show that the Nevada statute does not substantially conform to the
provisions of I.C. § 18-8004 is unavailing is because the language of the Nevada
statute is nearly identical to the language of a statute the Court of Appeals has
already held substantially conforms to the provisions of I.C. § 18-8004.

In

3 Pursuant to a 2009 amendment, subsection (8) of Idaho Code section 18-8005,
cited by the Court of Appeals in Moore, was redesignated as subsection (10).
2009 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 184, § 5.
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Moore, supra, the Court of Appeals examined North Dakota's DUI statute to
determine if Moore's prior DUI conviction in North Dakota could properly be used
to enhance his Idaho DUI to a felony. Moore, 148 Idaho at 896-99, 231 P.3d at
541-44. Like the Nevada statute at issue in this case, the North Dakota statute
provided that it was unlawful for any person to drive or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle if the person had an alcohol concentration of a certain limit,
as determined by a "test within two hours after the driving or being in actual
physical control of the vehicle."

19..: at 896,

231 P.3d at 541 (quoting N.D. Cent.

Code § 39-08-01 (1997)). Comparing the plain language of the North Dakota
statute with that of I.C. § 18-8004, the Court determined that "both statutes
'prohibit the same essential conduct - driving while under the influence of
alcohol' and 'frame their prohibitions using the same language, requiring
substantially conforming elements to be met to sustain a violation.'" Moore, 148
Idaho at 898, 231 P.3d at 543 (quoting Schmoll, 144 Idaho at 804, 172 P.3d at
559).

In light of the Moore Court's ultimate conclusion - i.e., "that the North

Dakota statute was substantially conforming to the Idaho DUI statute," id. at 89899, 231 P.3d at 543-44 - Juarez's argument that the nearly identically worded
Nevada DUI statute is not "substantially conforming" necessarily fails.
In

a further attempt to demonstrate Nevada's statute does not

substantially conform to the provisions of I.C. § 18-8004, Juarez identifies what
he characterizes as a "second glaring difference in elements between the two
DUI statutes." (Appellant's brief, p.10.) Specifically, he points out that, pursuant
to I.C. § 18-8004(2), the state is prohibited from prosecuting a person for DUI if a
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B.A.C. test shows the person to have an alcohol concentration of less that 0.08.
(Appellant's brief, p.10.) Based on this provision, Juarez argues that an "implied
element of Idaho's DUI (alcohol) statute ... is that the person's blood alcohol
concentration, when such a result is available and reliable, was above 0.08 at
the time of driving, regardless of whether the crime was charged as a per se
violation or under the actual impairment language prohibiting driving while 'under
the influence.'" (ld.) Because no such "element" appears, impliedly or expressly,
in Nevada's DUI statute, Juarez argues the statutes are not "substantially
conforming." (Id.) Juarez's argument fails for two reasons.
First, the prohibition against prosecuting a person for DUI contained in
subsection (2) of I.C. § 18-8004 is not an "element" of DUI. The elements of DUI
are set forth in subsection (1) of the statute, which clearly provides that a person
is guilty of DUI if the person drives or is in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle and is either "under the influence of alcohol" or "has an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 ... or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or
breath." I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a); See also, State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132,
134, 867 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Ct. App. 1994) (the offense of DUI may be
established "under either of two alternative theories of proof: (1) by direct or
circumstantial evidence of impairment of ability to drive due to the influence of
alcohol; or (2) by forensic testing of the driver's blood, breath or urine showing an
alcohol content in excess of the statutory limit."). That the person took a test that
showed his or her alcohol concentration to be less than 0.08 is merely an
affirmative defense to the prosecution of DUI on an actual impairment theory; it
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is not itself an element of the crime. See Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857,
_ , 292 P.3d 248, 253 (2012) ("An affirmative defense is [a] defendant's
assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs or
prosecution's claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true.") (brackets
original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Because the I.C. §§

18-8005(6) and (10) analysis of whether a foreign criminal violation is
"substantially conforming" to the provisions of I.C. § 18-8004 turns on a
comparison of only the elements of the respective statutes, the fact that
Nevada's DUI statute does not provide an affirmative defense similar to that set
forth in I.C. § 18-8004(2) is irrelevant.
Second, even assuming the language of I.C. § 18-8004(2) creates an
implied element that must be proved to establish a DUI on an actual impairment
theory, the fact that such element is absent from Nevada's DUI statute does not
show the two statutes are not "substantially conforming."

To the state's

knowledge, the prohibition against prosecuting DUI on an impairment theory
when a test shows the person's alcohol concentration was below 0.08 is unique
to Idaho; such prohibition does not appear in the DUI statutes of any other state.
If, as Juarez contends, the absence of such prohibition from Nevada's DUI
statute prevents a finding that that statute is "substantially conforming" to the
provisions of I.C. § 18-8004, then no other DUI statute in the country could ever
qualify under I.C. § 18-8005(10) as "substantially conforming to the provisions of
section 18-8004."

Clearly, that could not have been the legislature's intent.

Rather, as noted by the Court of Appeals in Moore, and already set forth in the
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preceding arguments, interpreting the term "substantially conforming" to mean
that "another state's DUI statute may never encompass conduct that would not
be illegal in Idaho" "would deviate from the general thrust of Schmoll and I.C. §
18-8005([10]), as well as run counter to the legislature's clear intent evidenced
by using the term 'substantially conforming,' as opposed to a dictate that the
statutes be exactly the same." Moore, 148 Idaho at 898,231 P.3d at 543.
The plain language of I.C. § 18-8005(10) requires that the Nevada DUI
statute and I.C. § 18-8004 be compared to determine if the two statutes are
substantially conforming. That comparison shows they are because they have
virtually identical elements expressed in the same or very similar language and
prohibit the same essential conduct - driving under the influence of alcohol.
Because the Nevada DUI statute substantially conforms to the provisions of I.C.

§ 18-8004, the district court correctly determined, as a matter of law, that
Juarez's prior Nevada DUI conviction qualifies as "a substantially conforming
foreign criminal violation" for purposes of enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 188005(6).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon Juarez's conviction for felony DUI.
DATED this 1st day of May 2013.

I A. FLEMIN
Deputy Attorney
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